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Abstract. Biometric cryptosystems combine cryptography and biomet-
rics to benefit from the strengths of both fields. In such systems, while
cryptography provides high and adjustable security levels, biometrics
brings in non-repudiation and eliminates the need to remember pass-
words or to carry tokens etc. In this work we present a biometric cryp-
tosystems which uses online signatures, based on the Fuzzy Vault scheme
of Jules et al. The Fuzzy Vault scheme releases a previously stored key
when the biometric data presented for verification matches the previ-
ously stored template hidden in a vault. The online signature of a person
is a behavioral biometric which is widely accepted as the formal way of
approving documents, bank transactions, etc. As such, biometric-based
key release using online signatures may have many application areas.
We extract minutiae points (trajectory crossings, endings and points of
high curvature) from online signatures and use those during the locking
& unlocking phases of the vault. We present our preliminary results and
demonstrate that high security level (128 bit encryption key length) can
be achieved using online signatures.
1 Introduction
Biometric authentication is the task of verifying the identity of individuals based
on their physiological (e.g. fingerprint, face) or behavioral traits (e.g. signature).
During authentication, biometric traits of a person are matched against the
stored biometric profile of the claimed identity and access is granted if there
is sufficient match. Biometric systems are gaining popularity as more trustable
alternatives to password-based security systems, since there are no passwords to
remember and biometrics cannot be stolen and are difficult to copy. Biometrics
also provide non-repudiation (an authenticated user cannot deny having done
so) to some degree because of the difficulty in copying or stealing someone’s
biometrics.
On the other hand, biometric traits are known to be variable and noisy. The
same biometric may change between consecutive acquisitions (due to injury,
ageing, even mood etc.) and noise can be introduced to a biometric signal by
an acquisition device or the environment. While it would be very convenient to
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use biometric traits for encryption, for instance someone using his fingerprint or
handwritten signature to encrypt a document and securely send it over public
network, this seems very difficult due to the aforementioned variability of the
biometric signals and the fact that encryption and decryption operations cannot
tolerate the perturbation of even a single bit. In its most basic sense, generating
a cryptographic key from a biometric trait, say fingerprints, has not been very
successful, as it involves obtaining an exact key from a highly variable data. For
instance Feng and Wah has only been able to generate a 40-bit private key from
online signatures with an 8% equal error rate (error obtained either because the
private key generated from a genuine signature does not match the public key
of the person, or the private key generated from a forgery matches the genuine
public key of a template) [7].
Uludag et al. makes the distinction between two general approaches within
what they call crypto-biometric systems), according to the coupling level of cryp-
tography and biometrics [6]: Biometrics-based key release refers to the use of
biometric authentication to release a previously stored cryptographic key. Bio-
metric authentication is used as a wrapper, adding convenience to traditional
cryptography where the user would have been in charge of remembering his/her
key; however the two techniques are only loosely coupled. Biometrics-based key
generation refers to extracting/generating a cryptographic key from a biomet-
ric template or construct. In this case, biometrics and cryptography are tightly
coupled: the secret key is bound to the biometric information and the biometric
template is not stored in plain form.
Recent work of Juels et al. [1] and Tuyls et al. [2] are classified as biometrics-
based key generation, as they require a tight coupling of cryptography and bio-
metrics. In particular, the work of Juels et al. forms the basis of this paper [1].
The fuzzy vault construct is an example of recent research which focus on com-
bining cryptography and biometrics to take advantage of the benefits of both
fields [1][2][3][4][5]: while biometrics provide non-repudiation and convenience,
traditional cryptography provides adjustable levels of security and can be used
not just for authentication, but also for encryption. Jules and Wattenberg pro-
posed the fuzzy commitment scheme [8]; later Juels and Sudan extended it to the
fuzzy vault scheme [1] and described how it can be used to construct/release an
encryption key using one’s biometrics: a secret (cryptographic key) is ”locked”
using a biometric data of a person, such that someone who possesses a sub-
stantial amount of the locking elements (e.g. another reading of the same bio-
metric) would be able to decrypt the secret. In summary, using the fuzzy vault
scheme, one can store a cryptographic key in what’s called a vault and later
extract/release it by presenting his/her biometrics.
The fuzzy vault scheme is classified as a key-generation scheme in Uludag et
al., because of its tight coupling of cryptography and biometrics [6]. However, in
the sense that the biometric data releases a previously stored key, it can also be
seen as a releasing mechanism. Yang and Verbauwhede and Uludag et al. [9, 10]
implemented the fuzzy vault using fingerprints, making simplifying assumptions
about the biometric data.
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In this paper we present an implementation of the fuzzy vault construct using
online signatures [1].
2 Previous Work
2.1 Fuzzy Vault
Jules and Sudan proposed a scheme called fuzzy vault, which they call an error
tolerant encryption operation [1]. Fuzzy vault scheme provides a framework to
encrypt (”lock”) some secret value (eg. cryptographic key) using an unordered
set of locking elements as a key, such that someone who possesses a substantial
amount of the locking elements will be able to decrypt the secret. It is based
on the difficulty of the polynomial reconstruction problem. The encoding and
decoding are done as follows:
Assume that Alice wants to secure her cryptographic key S (a random bit
stream) using an arbitrary set of elements A. She selects a polynomial P (x)
of degree D and encodes S into the polynomial’s coefficients. Encoding can be
achieved by slicing S into non-overlapping bit chunks and then mapping these
onto the coefficients. The mapping must be invertible meaning that the co-
efficients can be unambiguously mapped back to the corresponding bit chunks,
which when concatenated will reconstruct the S. Then, Alice evaluates the poly-
nomial at each element of her set A and stores these evaluation pairs into the set
G, where G = {(a1, P (a1)), (a2, P (a2)), ..., (aN , P (aN ))}, ai ∈ A and |A| = N .
Finally, she generates a random set R of pairs such that none of the pairs in
that set lie on the polynomial; and she merges the sets G and R into a final set,
to obtain the vault, which she then makes public. Note that within the vault,
it is not known which points belong to G and which ones belong to R. All the
steps required to lock a secret in the Fuzzy Vault are graphically represented in
Figure 1.
Now suppose that Bob has his own set of elements B and he wants to find out
(”unlock”) Alice’s secret locked in the vault. He will be able to do so only if his
set B largely overlaps with Alice’s A, so as to identify a substantial number of the
pairs that lie on the polynomial, from the vault. Given at least D+1 pairs that
lie on the polynomial, he applies one of the known polynomial reconstruction
techniques (eg. Lagrange interpolating polynomial) to reconstruct the polyno-
mial and thus extracts her secret S. Notice that if Bob does not know which
of the points of the vault lie on the polynomial, it should be computationally
infeasible for him to unlock the vault.
Whereas perturbation of a single bit in a key of a classical cryptosystem
(eg. AES, RSA) hinders decryption completely, the fuzzy vault allows for some
minor differences between the encryption & decryption keys; here the unordered
sets used to lock & unlock the vault. This fuzziness is necessary for use with
biometrics since different measurements of the same biometric often result in
(slightly) different signals. Furthermore, for most of the known biometric signals,
it is hard to establish a consistent ordering within the measured features. For
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Fig. 1. Vault Locking phase: (a) Create a polynomial by encoding the Secret as its co-
efficients. (b) Project genuine features onto the polynomial: ai represents the subject’s
i’th feature. (c) Randomly create chaff points (represented by small black circles) and
add to the Vault. (d) Final appearance of the Vault, as stored to the system database.
instance two impressions of the same fingerprint can have substantial distortion
and the number of features may vary between the two impressions.
Since the fuzzy vault scheme can tolerate some difference between the locking
& unlocking sets and does not requiring ordering amongst the set elements,
it has a potential to be used in biometric cryptosystems. However it is not
straightforward how to implement a fuzzy vault using a particular biometric
data, due to the difficulty of matching the template and query biometric signals
(i.e. locking and unlocking sets, respectively) within the presence of random data
(the chaff points).
2.2 Fuzzy Vault with Fingerprints
Uludag et al. [10] demonstrated a preliminary implementation of the fuzzy vault
scheme using fingerprints. Yang and Verbauwhede [9] also implemented the fuzzy
vault with fingerprints, but they made the assumption that rotation & transla-
tion invariant features can be reliably extracted from minutiae -which is difficult
in practice. Furthermore, they store reference minutia point along with the vault,
which may also leak some information. We will review the system by Uludag et
al. as it relates the most to our proposed scheme.
Minutia points of template & query fingerprints were used as locking &
unlocking sets, respectively, to lock a 128-bit long data (S) which forms the
cryptographic key. More precisely, the values obtained by concatenation of the
corresponding x & y coordinates of minutiae points were used as set elements.
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To make sure that the desired S was unlocked from the vault through an error-
prone process, cyclic redundancy check bits (16 bits) were concatenated to S.
Then, S, together with its check bits, was divided into non-overlapping chunks
(16 bits each), giving the coefficients, of an 8th degree polynomial. To lock the
secret, template minutiae set was projected onto this polynomial and random
chaff points not lying on the polynomial are added, to form the vault. Based
on their empirical estimations, they used only 18 minutia points and 200 chaff
points.
To unlock the secret, i.e. reconstruct S, they first match the query minutia
set with the abscissa part of the vault and identify candidate points lying on
the polynomial. Since D + 1 points are required to reconstruct a polynomial of
degree D, all possible 9 point combinations of the candidate set are tried, to find
the one with the correct check bits. S is successfully unlocked when the check
bits verify. Authors report a 79% of correct reconstruction rate with 0% false
accept rate.
To bypass the problem of matching the minutiae points and finding an upper
bound for the performance of the scheme, the authors have used a fingerprint
database where minutia points and the correspondence between template &
query fingerprints were established by an expert. During their experiments, the
minutiae sets of mating fingerprints were pre-aligned (i.e. rotated & translated)
according to the established correspondence, and used as such.
3 Proposed Method
In this section we demonstrate an implementation of the Fuzzy Vault scheme
using online signatures. Online (dynamic) signature are captured by pressure-
sensitive tablets that extract dynamic properties of a signature in addition to
its shape, which is the only available information in offline (static) signatures
found on bank checks and documents. Dynamic features include the number
and order of the strokes, the overall speed of the signature, the pen pressure at
each point, etc. and make the signature more unique and more difficult to forge.
As a result, online signature verification is more reliable than offline signature
verification and much more commonly used as a biometric. Throughout the rest
of the paper, we use the term signature to mean an online signature.
It is very challenging to find a representation of a particular biometric suitable
for the fuzzy vault scheme. Similar to the minutiae points defining branch and
end points in fingerprints, we extract the event points of a signature (hereafter
called minutiae points) and use them as locking or unlocking sets in the fuzzy
vault construct. Given a signature’s trajectory, we consider crossings, endings
and places of high curvature as minutiae points, where each minutia is a two
dimensional point (x & y coordinates) defined in the Cartesian space of the
pressure sensitive tablet .
Figure 2 demonstrates an example signature with marked minutiae points
points. For the time being, minutiae points are marked by experts, i.e. they are
not extracted automatically. This is done in order to measure true performance
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of the vault, i.e. to prevent error which could be introduced by an imperfect
minutiae extraction algorithm.
Note that these minutiae points do not capture the timing of a signature,
nor the ordering of the strokes; in fact they only use the shape of the signature.
Nonetheless, the results are encouraging compared to the results obtained with
previous implementations of fuzzy vault.
Fig. 2. The Figure demonstrates a genuine signature (on top) and minutiae points
marked for that signature (at the bottom).
During the locking phase, we concatenate the x & y coordinates of minutiae
points and project these on to the secret polynomial, as described in Section 2.1.
Minutiae coordinates and their corresponding projections, along with random
chaff points constitute the locking set of the vault. Although chaff points are
created randomly, special attention must be paid to the situations where chaff
points are generated too close to the genuine points or other chaff points. If
placed too close to minutiae points, the unlocking performance will be reduced
since chaff point located in close proximity to the genuine points may be mistak-
enly matched during unlocking phase. Closely generated chaff points may leak
information if a malicious attacker knows the closest possible distance between
two genuine points. Finally, chaff points must be homogeneously distributed in
the vault space; otherwise, they may leak information, enabling an attacker to re-
duce his search space and decrease the vault’s strength. Figure 3 shows a sample
vault which is generated within this system.
During the unlocking phase, the correspondence between points of unlock-
ing minutiae set and those of the vault must be determined. Although there
are numerous point matching algorithms, we used exhaustive matching to re-
duce the error which may be introduced by the matching algorithm. Exhaustive
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Fig. 3. Fuzzy Vault Locking: genuine points (stars) and chaff (dots) points are rep-
resented separately on the left for the sake of clarity. The actual vault shown on the
right, only contains the points without any information about their source (genuine or
chaff).
matching is performed by applying all possible rotations & translations (in the
vault space) to the unlocking set, to find the alignment with the most number of
matching points. Figure 4 shows the result of matching genuine (left) and forgery
(right) minutiae sets with the vault (matched vault points are circled). As can be
seen, while genuine unlocking set substantially overlaps with the vault’s genuine
points, the forgery set dioes not.
Fig. 4. Fuzzy Vault Matching: matching of genuine (left) and forgery (right) minutiae
sets with the vault from fig. 3. matched vault points are shown circled and minutiae
(stars) and chaff (dots) points of the vault are represented differently for the sake of
clarity.
As a result of matching, we obtain a candidate set of points which are then
used for decoding the secret key. During each iteration of the decoding phase,
we select D + 1 points from candidate set where D is the degree of the secret
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polynomial and use them to decode the secret as described in Section 2.1. The
polynomial degree was fixed at nine and didn’t change during testing.
During the locking phase, a cryptographic hash of the secret is also stored
in the system database, along with the vault points. During unlocking, we cal-
culate the hash of the decoded secret and compare it with the one stored in the
system’s database. Decoding phase terminates when both hash values match (se-
cret is decoded) or when maximum number of iterations is performed (secret not
revealed). These steps are similar to the fuzzy vault implementation of Uludag
et al. [10].
4 Results
The system performance was evaluated using sample signatures supplied by 10
subjects enrolled to our system. All signatures in our dataset were acquired
using same tablet and sampled at 100 sample points per second rate. Each
subject supplied 4 genuine signatures for a total of 40 signatures. There were no
constraints on how to sign, nor was any information given about the working
principles of the system, so that the subjects signed in their most natural way.
All possible combinations of 2 signatures out of 4 reference signatures sup-
plied by each subject were used to measure the vault’s genuine performance (i.e.
correct unlocking rate of the vault). Thus, 6 such signature pairs were obtained
for each user and 60 such pairs were tested in total.
To collect skilled forgeries, we added a signing simulation module to our sys-
tem. Simulation module animates the signing process of a given signature so that
the forger could see not only the signature trajectory’s points sequence but also
the signing dynamics (speed and acceleration). Forgers had a chance of watching
the signature’s animation several times and practice tracing over the signature
image a few times before forging it. We have totally collected 30 skilled forgeries
(3 forgeries for each subject), following above mentioned protocol. Each forgery
signature was paired with each of the corresponding reference signatures (4 such
pairs per forgery signature) and used as such during locking & unlocking phases,
where reference signature was used to lock and forgery signature to unlock the
vault, respectively. Totally 120 such pairs were obtained for our dataset, which
are used to measure weakness of the vault against fraud.
We have obtained the 8.33% of failure rate to unlock the vault when a gen-
uine signature was presented (i.e. can be considered as false reject rate) and
2.50% of false unlocking rate when the vault was attempted to be opened us-
ing forgery signatures. Obtained results are promising. Most of the failures to
unlock the vault with genuine signatures are due to the high variability within
reference signatures, supplied by a corresponding user. On the other hand, false
unlocking rate obtained used forgery signatures is due to the fact that we use
only minutiae points of the signature, which don’t incorporate dynamic features
of corresponding genuine signer thus easier to compromise. The false accept rate
can be reduced by increasing the polynomial degree, of course at the expense of
slight increase in FRR. Conversely, FRR can be lowered by more efficient chaff
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point generation, which could assure that number of genuine points matching
chaff points doesn’t exceed a certain threshold. On average, it took approxi-
mately 30 seconds to unlock a vault with it’s corresponding genuine signature.
Troughout the test a notebook computer with Intel Celeron (M) 1.5GHz and
512 megabyte of RAM hardware configuration was used. All algorithms were
implemented using Matlab.
5 Summary and Conclusion
Bio-cryptosystems combine cryptography and biometrics to take advantage of
the benefits of both fields: while biometrics provide non-repudiation and conve-
nience, traditional cryptography provides adjustable levels of security and can
be used not just for authentication, but also for encryption. Fuzzy Vault scheme
[1] is a promising framework for such bio-cryptosystems, as it doesn’t require
ordered representation of a biometric and it can tolerate variations within bio-
metric up to some extent.
We have demonstrated an implementation of the Fuzzy Vault scheme using
online signatures, which runs in real time. Even though our method is a relatively
straightforward extension of the fuzzy vault scheme implementation by Uludag
et al. [10], the issues encountered in implementing the fuzzy vault with online
signatures were non-trivial. Besides, it is the first realisation of the scheme using
online signatures which demonstrated promising performance results.
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